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reasoning of this Court, and ignores the holdings of the majority 
of jurisdictions that indicate a psychotherapist owes a "duty" to 
third persons who are not specifically identified. The duty exists 
when the therapist knows, or should know, using appropriate 
standards of care, that the patient's condition endangers others. 
Finally, Valley erroneously attempts to retroactively apply 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14A-102 by suggesting it "codified" the common 
law. This attempt contradicts the principle that statutes cannot 
be retroactively applied and contradicts the legislative intent of 
the statute to permit recovery in cases like this. The Utah 
legislature in floor debate expressly acknowledged the "duty" of 
the psychotherapist to exercise reasonable care and meet profes-
sional standards to protect even unidentified victims from 
dangerous patients and deliberately limited the statute to permit 
a claim for the breach of the duty. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. VALLEY'S PROCLAIMED INTEREST IN THIS CASE OF 
PROTECTING ITS "MISSION" IS NOT FACTUALLY 
SUPPORTED AND DEFIES ITS PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATION 
TO PROTECT THE VICTIMS OF THE MENTALLY ILL. 
1
 Valley's injection of Utah Code Ann, § 78-14A-102 is 
improper. The only remaining defendant in this case is Salt Lake 
County Mental Health ("SLCMH") which did not raise or rely upon 
this statute at all in the court below or in this Court. The 
University of Utah Medical Center did raise the statute but then 
settled. In a similar circumstance, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals held it could not consider an argument by an amicus because 
it was "not properly before us." National Com'n on Egg Nutrition 
v. F.T.C., 570 F.2d. 157 (7th Cir. 1977). 
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Bowers and Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: 
An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action/ 
1984 Wis. L. Rev. 443# 465-67; Mills, Sullivan 
& Eth, Protecting Third Parties: A Decade 
After Tarasoff, 144 Am. J. Psych. 68, 71 (Jan. 
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meet accepted standards to avoid assaults on innocent victims will 
only serve to fulfill Valley's stated mission of promoting the 
emotional and physical well being of the community.2 
B. VALLEY'S "ISSUES" DO NOT RECOGNIZE THE RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN SLCMH AND TRUJILLO AND THE STATUS 
OF SHAUNDRA HIGGINS AS AN ENDANGERED VICTIM. 
Valley's "Statement of Issues" sidesteps crucial and signifi-
cant facts. Valley casts the issue as whether a duty was owed to 
take precautions to protect "an unidentified victim." (Valley 
Brief at 3). In framing the issue this way, Valley does not 
acknowledge that throughout the 70's and early to mid-1980's, 
Trujillo received both voluntary and involuntary in-patient and 
out-patient treatment from SLCMH, and that during this period she 
incessantly displayed violent behavior. Nor does the "issue" 
properly conform to the standard applied by the majority of cases 
that does not require the victim be "identified" as a prerequisite 
to liability. As shown below, the courts allow recovery by 
unidentified victims endangered by the risk engendered by the 
patient's condition. 
2Valley's appearance as an amicus curiae is a way for SLCMH, 
the predecessor-in-interest to Valley, to argue its case twice. 
Valley's appearance really serves as an example of the misappli-
cation of governmental immunity principles by Appellee SLCMH. 
SLCMH has consistently argued that it is entitled to "governmental 
immunity." This argument denies that "governmental immunity" 
applies where a function is undertaken "which only government can 
perform." Standiford v. Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). 
Since Appellant's claims arise out of activities that can be 
performed by non-governmental entities like Valley, a private 
corporation, and since those activities are not exclusively 
"governmental," there can be no immunity. See Schultz v. Conger, 
755 P.2d 165 (Utah 1988). 
-4-
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Further, despite Valley's recognition that the facts which are 
relevant to the issue of duty must be considered in the light most 
favorable to Shaundra and Kathy Higgins, Valley purposely avoids a 
critical fact when it suggests that Caroline Trujillo was stimulat-
ed to attack Shaundra Higgins by "voices" which instructed her to 
"hurt someone." (Valley Brief at 5). Although there is one 
instance where Caroline Trujillo stated this, the overwhelming 
evidence shows Trujillo was preoccupied with Kathy and Shaundra 
Higgins for months preceding the attack on Shaundra and responded 
to a voice telling her to stab Shaundra. Trujillo was interviewed 
after the stabbing by Jean A. Nohava, a psychologist at the Utah 
State Hospital. Trujillo told psychologist Nohava that: 
[Approximately 6 months prior to the inci-
dent, this young girl (a neighbor) had beaten 
up her daughter, a 10-year old. She stated 
that this girl and her mother would pass the 
house and laugh at Caroline. She stated that 
at one time she observed the mother stick her 
tongue out at her. Caroline relates that she 
spent much of her time by herself, and that 
she brooded a great deal about the aforemen-
tioned incidents. 
On the day of the attack, Caroline states 
that she was thinking about this and was 
getting quite agitated as she worried over it. 
She states that one of her 'voices' told her 
what to do. . . . 
Upon the suggestion of the 'voice' which 
told her to get a knife and stab the child, 
she obtained a knife and began walking towards 
the victim's house. She saw the little girl 
leaving her house, walking in the opposite 
direction, so she ran after her and attacked 
her. Caroline maintains that she was not 
trying to kill the little girl, only to hurt 
her and her mother. She continues to see 
nothing wrong with her action. She expressed 
the thought that it was not an 'evil deed' and 
-6-
that she would most likely do the same thing 
again under the same circumstances. [R. at 
2067-2068]. 
Trujillo made similar statements to other psychologists and 
psychiatrists after the stabbing. She told Dr. Robert J. Howell, 
Ph.D., that "she knew this girl and this girl had been beating up 
on her daughter and so she stabbed the girl." [R. at 652]. 
Trujillo also told Dr. Allen Jeppson, a psychiatrist, that "the 
victim had previously hurt her daughter by hitting her," that "if 
the girl hit her daughter again that she would stab her again" and 
that "she wished she would have died." [R. at 629]. 
In addition to the facts asserted by Valley, there are also 
material facts relating to Utah Code Ann., § 78-14(a)-102 (Supp. 
1988) which Valley argues should be retroactively applied in this 
case. These undisputed facts are: 
1. The cause of action upon which the Appellant brought this 
case arose on or before April 10, 1984. 
2. Four years later, the legislature enacted U.C.A. § 78-
14(a)-101 et seq., which is attached to Valley's brief (hereinafter 
"the Utah Act"). The Utah Act did not become effective until April 
25, 1988, pursuant to Utah Constitution, Article 6, Section XXV. 
3. As originally drafted as House Bill No. 2, the Utah Act, 
followed and used a California statute as a model, which granted 
total immunity to psychotherapists from violent acts of their 
patients except in situations where the patient communicated 
violence against a reasonably identifiable victim. [R. at 1778]. 
-7-
4. The original wording of House Bill No. 2 provided that 
11
 [A] therapist is immune from liability and no cause of action 
arises against him for failure to predict, warn, or take precau-
tions to provide protection from any violent behavior of his client 
or patient, unless that client or patient communicated to the 
therapist an actual threat of physical violence against a clearly 
identified or reasonably identifiable victim." [R. at 1820]. 
5. House Bill No. 2 was objected to by representative Stanley 
Smedley as being broader than its stated purpose. In the floor 
debate, Representative Smedley and the sponsor, Representative 
Arrington had the following exchange: 
[Representative Smedley:] To the sponsor and 
then could I reserve the right to suggest a 
possible amendment. The concern I have, my 
understanding is that the desire you would 
have is if a patient receives a threat, for 
instance, to someone's life, that therapist 
may go through certain procedures to notify 
the authorities or that individual if the 
threat has been made, the therapist would then 
be relieved from obligation or liability. Is 
that correct? 
[Representative Arrington:] That's the pur-
pose of the bill. 
[Representative Smedley:] Okay. The concern 
I would have then is the bill seems to go far 
beyond that as I see it, in that it releases a 
therapist from any liability of any kind 
regardless of what may take place in the 
course of his counseling and then it goes on 
to say that if a threat is made he's released 
from liability if he notifies certain individ-
uals. As an example, if a therapist is over a 
person in a state institution, such as the 
State Hospital, he makes a recommendation that 
the person be released from care and his 
recommendation is a really poorly evaluated 
decision. That person then goes back into 
society and creates an offense which other 
-8-
therapists would look at and say he never 
should have been released. It seems to me 
that the person who is injured should have a 
right to say to that therapist: "You have a 
responsibility and an obligation to society 
and your profession to act within a certain 
standard of care." But this bill seems to 
absolve him from any responsibility of any 
kind, as I see it. 
[Representative Arrington:] I don't think it 
does, no. You are talking about something 
that is not included. You know your standard 
of care. If a therapist or a doctor whoever 
might be willfully disregards the safety of 
society or individuals there isn't a law in 
the world that protects him from that. And 
your standard of work ethic and the ethics of 
the professions would preclude any immunity 
from liability of something of that nature. 
[Representative Smedley:] I think that this 
bill does that very thing, though, Irby and 
that's the concern I have, is that it cuts off 
any responsibility that the therapist has. . . 
[R. at 1824-1828]. 
6. Pursuant to the objection in floor debate, the bill was 
tabled in order for it to be amended to remove the broad immunity 
from liability, and was redrafted to apply only to the fact 
situation referred to in the statute. [R. at 1822; Aff'd of 
Representative Stan Smedley; R. at 1835]. 
D. THE EXISTENCE AND SCOPE OF "DUTY" IS A LEGAL 
ISSUE DEPENDENT UPON THE FACTS IN THE RECORD. 
Valley asserts that this Court's decision on the existence and 
scope of duty can be made without considering the quality of 
"medical" care provided by SLCMH. (Valley Brief at 4). This 
assertion ignores that SLCMH exerted "control" over Trujillo by its 
"medical care." There is no dispute that SLCMH breached profes-
-9-
sional standards by failing to admit Trujillo to its in-patient 
unit and "discharging" her into the same environment where she had 
committed the prior stabbing. 
Ignoring the medical care also allows Valley to avoid the fact 
that Trujillofs medical treatment resulted in the stabbing. The 
record clearly shows SLCMH did not administer the medications that 
it prescribed and knew were necessary for treatment of Trujillo's 
violence and psychotic state. Not only is it appropriate to 
consider the medical care, it is necessary to fully consider 
Appellant's claims. 
Further, Valley's repeated suggestion that Trujillo was a 
"voluntary patient" myopically denies her history with SLCMH. That 
history demonstrates an association over nine years with "volun-
tary" and "involuntary placements." As noted by the Appellant in 
her Reply to SLCMH, the "status" of Trujillo on the day of the 
stabbing as being "voluntary" does not eliminate "duty." (Appel-
lant's Reply to SLCMH at 13-15). 
Moreover, this Court has expressly recognized the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 315 can impose a duty to control a person. See 
Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1989). The Owens case 
was recently cited in Mahomes-Vinson v. U.S., 751 F. Supp. 913 (D. 
Kan. 1990), where the court applied the "special relationship" 
theory to a case like this where the assailant was "voluntary" on 
the day of the assault but had a long psychiatric history that 
included "involuntary" commitments. Particularly important, the 
court also considered Hokansen v. United States, 868 F.2d 372 (10th 
-10-
Cir. 1989), the federal case interpreting Kansas law upon which 
SLCMH relies to claim no duty is owed when the patient is "volun-
tary." Despite Hokansen, the court in Mahomes-Vinson still allowed 
recovery in Kansas under the special relationship analysis. The 
court writes at 920: 
A majority of jurisdictions have recognized a 
duty to control pursuant to § 315. Under the 
Restatement approach, the psychotherapist/ 
patient relationship has been found to be a 
sufficient basis for imposing an affirmative 
duty on the therapist for the benefit of third 
persons. See, e.g., Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 
1064 (Del. 1988) (psychiatrist-discharged 
mental patient); Bradley Center, Inc. v. 
Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982) 
(mental health hospital-outpatient); Evans v. 
Morehead Clinic, 749 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1988) 
(psychotherapist-discharged mental patient); 
Duval v. Golden, 139 Mich. App. 342, 362 
N.W.2d 275 (1984) (psychiatrist-outpatient); 
Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hospital and 
Health Center, 529 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 1988) 
(psychiatrist-outpatient); Peck v. Counseling 
Serv. , 146 Vt. 61, 499 A.2d 422 (1985) (mental 
health hospital/counselor-outpatient); c.f. 
Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999 (D. 
Md. 1982) (psychiatrist-outpatient); Fischer 
v. Metcalf, 543 So.2d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1989) (psychiatrist-outpatient). 
Valley does not mention this long line of cases. Instead, 
Valley erroneously asserts that decisions from this Court that do 
not address the psychotherapist/patient relationship have analyzed 
the scope of the "special relation" theory to hold in other cases 
"that no duty was owed" to control or warn (Valley Brief at 10) and 
that there can be no "relationship" giving rise to a cognizable 
duty "unless a specific victim is identified." (Valley Brief at 
11.) 
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Valley overstates its argument and its conclusions cannot be 
fairly derived from this Court's decisions. For example, Valley 
erroneously claims that the Court analyzed the scope of the 
"special relation" exception in Christensen v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 
612 (Utah 1984) and Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). 
Even a cursory reading of Christensen shows the Court did not 
address the "special relationship" analysis. Christensen addressed 
a factual circumstance in which a police officer did not arrest an 
intoxicated motorcyclist prior to his fatal accident. The Court 
specifically indicated the facts before it were different than 
those concerning injuries to third parties. 694 P.2d at 614. 
Likewise, Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989) is not a 
"special relationship" case under the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 315. Ferree is a parole custody case in which a wrongful death 
claim against the State of Utah Board of Corrections was made. 
Ferree examined the "duty" owed by a governmental agency and its 
agents to protect the public against injury by a parolee who had no 
history of violence. The Court, in reaching the conclusion that 
liability should not be imposed on corrections officials, relied 
upon the factual circumstances that the parolee had "no prior 
history of violence or of making threats, and corrections officials 
had no reason to know of any physical threat that [the parolee] 
might pose to a victim." 784 P.2d at 152. 
Ferree is distinguishable from this case for several obvious 
reasons. First, unlike Ferree, there are no sound, public policy 
reasons to preclude liability of mental health care providers, 
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especially where the duty imposed is to diagnose and treat the 
patient within the parameters set by accepted standards in the 
profession. Second, in this case, Trujillo had an extensive and 
well-documented history of violence. If proper diagnostic and 
treatment procedures had been followed, her condition and violent 
propensities would have been properly evaluated and the required 
steps to protect her victims could have been taken. 
Finally, Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989) does not 
aid Valley. Owens recognized there is a duty to control under the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315. In Owens, the Court conclud-
ed, and the plaintiff conceded, that there was not a sufficiently 
close relationship between an unlicensed babysitter and the State 
for there to be a "special relationship" under Section 315. 784 
P.2d at 1189. In reaching this conclusion, the Court specifically 
compared the association between the babysitter and the State with 
the close "special relationship" of the state hospital and 
psychiatrist and a discharged patient in the case of Petersen v. 
State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983). Petersen affirmed a 
claim made by a member of the public who had been injured when a 
mental patient purposely drove into the victim's car. The Washing-
ton Supreme Court squarely held the psychiatrist had a duty to 
protect "any person who might foreseeably be endangered" by the 
patient's condition. 100 Wash.2d at 428-29, 671 P.2d at 237. 
Valley also argues from Owens and Ferree that there is no duty 
owed unless a specific victim is identified. Owens and Ferree do 
not so narrowly limit "duty." As demonstrated in Appellant's Reply 
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to SLCMH, Owens recognized that a police officer detaining an 
intoxicated driver may owe duty to unidentified third parties. In 
this circumstance, it is the ability, either practically or as a 
matter of statute, to control the dangerous person that defines the 
duty. In Ferree, the Court focused on the fact that the parolee, 
while in the control of the State, was not known to be dangerous or 
even have the potential to be dangerous and there "was no reason" 
to suspect the parolee to be violent "toward a particular person or 
a particular type of person." 784 P.2d at 152. 
A careful analysis of these opinions shows the Court did not 
impose the requirement that a victim be "identified," especially 
where the assailant is violent and there is a right or ability to 
control the patient. Indeed, the Court has permitted claims by 
unidentified third parties when the assailant has a history of 
violence and the ability to control exists. See, e.g., Doe v. 
Arquelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985). 
In many ways the Court's analysis in these cases is consistent 
with that employed in the jurisdictions that have recognized the 
"duty" of psychotherapist/mental health care providers. See, e.g., 
Mahomes-Vinson v. U.S., 751 F. Supp. 913, 923 (D. Kan. 1990) (duty 
owed by V.A. hospital and psychotherapist to persons endangered by 
the patient's condition and not limited to "identified" victims); 
Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1214 (Colo. 1989) (the absence of 
specific threats or overt violent behavior is not necessarily 
conclusive in that a psychiatrist is obliged to take reasonable 
precautions, consistent with accepted psychiatric standards of 
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practice, to protect potential victims from the patient's propensi-
ty for violence); Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1072 (Del. 1988) 
(duty requires the psychiatrist or other mental health professional 
to initiate whatever precautions are reasonably necessary to 
protect potential victims of the patient); Petersen v. State, 671 
P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983) (duty to protect victims endangered by the 
patient's condition); Mcintosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super, at 489, 
403 A.2d at 511-12 (psychiatrist or therapist may have a duty to 
take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to protect a potential 
victim of his patient). 
The criteria employed in these cases leads to the conclusion 
that Shaundra Higgins was owed "duty." Shaundra Higgins was a 
neighbor about whom Trujillo had brooded, and the stabbing of her 
followed a nearly identical stabbing. As a result of the first 
stabbing, Trujillo was sentenced to the care and custody of SLCMH 
which knew of the prior similar stabbing. 
Shaundra was also a person that the Utah mental health 
statutes are designed to protect. The statutes expressly indicate 
that a psychotherapist may exercise control over a patient that is 
a "danger" to others. For example, the Utah mental health statutes 
in 1984 provided for admission of a voluntary patient for care and 
observation. Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-29 stated that a "mental health 
facility [SLCMH was so designated] . . . may admit for observation, 
diagnosis, care and treatment any individual who is mentally ill or 
who has symptoms of mental illness . . . " In addition, Utah Code 
Ann. § 64-7-31 allowed for SLCMH to exercise control over a 
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voluntary patient to restrict release of a voluntary patient if it 
was "unsafe for the patient or others." SLCMH could have refused 
to discharge Trujillo if she demanded release for up to 48 hours 
during which time SLCMH could have tried to persuade her to be 
hospitalized by voluntary admission, or so that involuntary 
commitment procedures could be commenced. Utah law specifically 
provided that if a patient was a danger to self or others, there 
was a basis for an involuntary commitment. Utah Code Ann., § 64-7-
34 and 36.3 
In this case, Caroline Trujillo voluntarily sought hospital-
ization prior to the stabbing. The concern of infringing on her 
"liberty" interest evaporated. Because she was obviously psychotic 
and had a well-documented history of violence, SLCMH only had to 
admit her to its in-patient unit where control is implicit. See 
Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hospital and Health Center, 529 N.E.2d 
449, 460 (Ohio 1988) (discussing duty in a voluntary hospitaliza-
tion context). See also Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 775 P.2d 
1122 (Ariz. 1989) (affidavits from experts, like those submitted in 
this case, required issue of control and ability to control to be 
resolved at trial). Instead, SLCMH negligently controlled her by 
admitting her at ARTU and discharging her to the Higgins f neighbor-
Valley's argument that "duty" should not be imposed due to 
the inability to predict "dangerousness" belies the thrust of the 
mental health statutes which requires a prediction of dangerousness 
for involuntary commitment. The heart of the statutes require a 
"prediction" and to hold that the standard is uncertain raises 
serious questions as to the entire basis for commitment. Schuster 
v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d at 169; Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d at 
514. 
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hood. Even if Trujillo had resisted hospitalization, SLCMH could 
have admitted her by "involuntary commitment." See Mahomes-Vinson 
v. U.S., 751 F. Supp. 913, 922, n.14 (D. Kan. 1990). 
E. PUBLIC POLICY RECOGNIZES THE DUTY OF THE PSYCHO-
THERAPIST TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT OTHERS. 
1. The Predominant Policy Allows For a Victim To Recover 
Where Professional Standards are Breached. 
Valley's "public policy" arguments do not mention the 
predominant policy advanced by the courts when addressing the duty 
issue. Every thoughtful opinion, after carefully weighing "public 
policy," concludes that innocent victims in certain circumstances 
are entitled to be compensated for injuries caused by dangerous and 
mentally ill patients. The courts do not automatically impose 
liability, but require the plaintiff, as she did in this case, to 
show the psychotherapist did not use reasonable care, in accordance 
with the knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by psychiatric 
practitioners under similar circumstances, to protect the victim 
from future acts of violence by the patient. See, generally, 
Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. at 193; Naidu v. 
Laird, 539 A.2d at 1072-73; Mcintosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super, at 
489-90, 403 A.2d at 511-12; Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hospital 
and Health Center, 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 99, 529 N.E.2d 449, 460 
(1988); Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d at 428, 671 P.2d at 237; 
Schuster v. Altenberq, 144 Wis. 2d at 268-69, 424 N.W.2d at 174. 
The legitimate policy of allowing victims to recover in these 
circumstances was acknowledged by the Utah State Legislature when 
it considered the Therapist Liability Act enacted in 1988 at Utah 
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Code Ann, § 78-14(a)-101, et seq., which Valley wrongfully suggests 
"codified the common law" to preclude recovery.4 At the core of 
Valley's argument is the misconception that the statute's "policy" 
supports SLCMH. A careful reading of the legislative history of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14(a)-102 and the affidavit of Senator Stan 
Smedley who was instrumental in the passing of the statute [R. at 
1835] shows that if any "policy" was codified, it was the policy of 
permitting victims to recover where generally recognized profes-
sional standards of care are not met in the treatment of violent 
and mentally ill patients, and injury to the innocent victim 
results. 
The floor debates for this statute make this clear. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14(a)-102 was debated and narrowly redrafted in order to 
only address the specific question of a therapist's duty in a 
situation where the therapist receives information about a threat 
of violence. The statute was never meant to confer a blanket 
immunity from liability to a psychotherapist/mental health provider 
that fell below the standard of care and refused to admit and 
4The statute did not become effective until April 25, 1988, 
over four years after Appellant's cause of action accrued. 
Valley's interpretation of the statute to eliminate Appellant's 
claim violates the principle that the statute cannot be retroac-
tively applied. Stevens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 953-54 (Utah 
1987). The courts in other jurisdictions where legislatures have 
passed statutes that broadly provide for "immunity," which our 
legislature refused to do, have not given the statutes any 
retroactive application either directly or by retroactive applica-
tion of policy. See, e.g., Michael E. L. v. County of San Diego, 
228 Cal. Rptr. 139, 183 Cal. App. 3d 525 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 
1986); and Evans v. Morehead Clinic, 749 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1988). 
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properly treat a dangerous psychotic who presented a danger to 
"society or individuals."5 
Rather than address this dominant "policy/1 Valley claims that 
"duty" should not be imposed due to concerns of treating the 
mentally ill in a "least restrictive setting," the "difficulty of 
predicting dangerousness" and the desire to avoid detention of the 
mentally ill. Not one of these "policies" have convinced the 
courts to not impose duty. 
2. Imposing Duty Does Not Conflict With the Policy of 
Placing a Patient in the Least Restrictive Environment. 
Valley's contention that imposing "duty" conflicts with the 
goal of placing mental patients in the least restrictive environ-
ment is misplaced. 
The "liberty" interest of Caroline Trujillo is not an issue in 
this case. The record is absolutely clear that Trujillo and her 
family made numerous attempts to have Trujillo hospitalized. There 
is no concern that her "freedom" would have been jeopardized if 
5Valley's suggestion that the statute "codified the common 
law," to protect a psychotherapist unless there is an identified 
victim is wrong. The legislature originally considered a model 
California statute which was designed to eliminate the California 
common law and grant total immunity to psychotherapists from 
violent acts of patients, except in situations where the patient 
communicated violence against a "reasonably identifiable" victim. 
As a result of the strong objection on the Utah legislature floor, 
that the statute was too broad and would potentially relieve a 
therapist who breached standards of care, the legislature deliber-
ately redrafted the statute to apply only to the fact situation 
referred to in the statute. If anything, the statute "codified" 
the common law that a therapist must meet the standard of care in 
evaluating and treating a violent patient and in protecting her 
victims. 
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SLCMH had followed the standard of care and met Trujillo's and her 
family•s requests. 
Furthermore, Valley's contention misinterprets the nature of 
the duty imposed on the therapist. The recognition of "duty" does 
not make the therapist liable for any harm caused by the patient, 
but "makes him liable when his negligent treatment of the patient 
caused the injury in question." Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
497 F. Supp. 185, 192 (D. Neb. 1980). 
Moreover, there is no factual support for Valley's claim. In 
Schuster v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d 159, 175 (Wis. 1988) the Court 
specifically addressed the suggestion that the imposition of "duty" 
since the landmark case of Tarasoff v. Regents of California, 551 
P. 2d 334 (Cal. 1976) has led to increased use of involuntary 
commitments of patients: 
[D]ata collected in a survey of the impact of 
Tarasoff demonstrated that 'Tarasoff has not 
discouraged therapists from treating dangerous 
patients, nor has it led to an increased use 
of involuntary commitment of patients per-
ceived as dangerous.' Givelber, Bowers and 
Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empir-
ical Study of Private Law In Action, 1984 Wis. 
L. Rev., supra at 486. See, also, Melella, 
Travin and Cullen, supra p. 171, at 100 . . . 
Likewise, we have considered the legislative 
policy . . . which seeks to provide for the 
'least restrictive treatment . . .' As to this 
concern, we find the rationale articulated by 
the court in Lipari compelling: 
The recognition of this duty does 
not make the psychotherapist liable 
for any harm caused by his patient, 
but rather makes him liable only 
when his negligent treatment of the 
patient caused the injury in ques-
tion. . . . 'Thus, despite the defe-
ndant's protest to the contrary, a 
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psychotherapist is not subject to 
liability for placing his patient in 
a less restrictive environment, so 
long as he uses due care in assess-
ing the risks of such a placement. 
This duty is no greater than the 
duty already owing to the patient.1 
497 F. Supp. at 192-93 
Finally, the mere initiation of detention or 
commitment proceedings does not threaten the 
patient's constitutionally protected liberty. 
[The commitment statute] assures a constitu-
tionally proper procedure which must be fol-
lowed in order to secure the emergency deten-
tion or commitment of an individual. 
Thus, despite Valley's argument, a psychotherapist will not be 
liable for placing a patient in a less restrictive environment, so 
long as due care is used in assessing the risks of the placement. 
Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 192-93. However, in a case like this, 
where SLCMH was negligent in its decision to treat Trujillo at ARTU 
and "discharge" her, and misled the Trujillos about "lack of bed 
space," then there is no reason to not impose duty. 
3. The Alleged Difficulty of Predicting Dangerousness 
Does Not Justify Denying the Victim Relief. 
Similarly, Valley's notion that the difficulty in evaluating 
dangerousness should bar a victim's recovery has not been accepted. 
The recent Colorado opinion, Perreira v. State, 768 P. 2d 1198, 
1213-14 (Colo. 1989) states the rationale for the express rejection 
of Valley's claims: 
A psychiatrist is not expected to render a 
full proof prediction of future violence. 
Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 192. On the contrary, 
'[t]he concept of due care in appraising 
psychiatric problems, assuming proper proce-
dures are followed, must take account of the 
difficulty often inevitable in the definitive 
diagnosis.' Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 
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407, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1975). What is required 
of the psychiatrist is to exercise the reason-
able degree of skill and knowledge ordinarily 
possessed by practicing psychiatrists in 
arriving at an informed and realistic assess-
ment of the patient's present mental condition 
and propensity for violence so that an in-
formed judgment can be made as to whether the 
release of the patient will create an unrea-
sonable risk of serious bodily harm to others. 
See Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 193; Durflinqer, 
234 Kan. at 490-91, 673 P.2d at 92-93; Evans, 
749 S.W.2d at 699. 
In Schuster v. Altenberq, 424 N.W.2d 169 (Wis. 1988), another 
recent decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court made the point quite 
convincingly that psychiatrists can effectively evaluate dangerous-
ness: 
[a] survey of psychotherapists suggests that 
practitioners are quite confident of their 
ability to assess dangerousness. . . [t]he 
task of assessing dangerousness is not viewed 
as being beyond the competence of individual 
therapists or as a matter upon which thera-
pists cannot agree. 
And, in Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1074 (Del. 1988), the court 
rejected the Valley argument: 
[T]he argument for the defense ignores the 
fact that courts have recognized that under 
some circumstances, psychiatrists and mental 
hospitals may be held liable for failing to 
predict the dangerous propensities of their 
patients. See Hicks v. United States, D.C. 
Cir., 511 F.2d 407, 415-17 (1975); Lipari v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., D. Neb. 497 F. Supp. 
185, 191 (1980); Baker v. United States, S.D. 
Iowa, 226 F. Supp. 129, 132-35 (1964), aff'd. 
8th Cir. 343 F.2d 222 (1965); Tarasoff v. 
Regents of the University of California, Cal. 
supra, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20, 
551 P.2d 334, 340 (1976); Bradley Center, Inc. 
v. Wessner, 166 Georgia App. 576, 287 S.E.2d 
716, 720-21, afffd. Georgia, supra, 250 Ga. 
199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982); Rum River Lumber 
Company v. State, M. Super. 282 N.W.2d 882, 
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885 (1979); Mcintosh v. Milano, N.J. Super., 
168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500, 511 (1979); 
Peterson v. State, Wash. Super., 100 Wash. 2d 
421, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (1983). Although we 
recognize the inherent difficulty confronted 
by mental health professionals in determining 
whether a patient imposes an unreasonable 
threat of harm to himself or others, this 
factor alone does not justify barring recovery 
in all cases. Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
497 F. Supp. at 192. 
4. Imposition of Duty Does Not Lead to Unnecessary 
Restrictive Detention. 
Finally, Valley's argument that the imposition of "duty" will 
lead to the unnecessary commitment of the mentally ill has no 
support in the record. The same argument has been called "specula-
tive at best," unsupported "by any reliable statistical data" and 
rejected. Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d at 1219 (citing Mcintosh v. 
Milano, 168 N.J. Supp. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979) . See also Schuster 
v. Altenberq, 434 N.W.2d 159, 175 (Wis. 1988); Lipari v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. at 192-93 (citations omitted). 
F. BRADY V. HOPPER DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE. 
Valley mistakenly relies upon Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 
1333 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd. 750 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984) as the 
"best" case to examine duty. Brady, a relatively early case in a 
developing area of the law, does not hold, as Valley suggests, that 
the special relationship analysis results in the conclusion that 
there can never be "duty." Brady indicates that the psycho-
therapist/patient relationship does create a legal duty in favor of 
third persons: 
It is implicit in the majority of cases in 
this area that the therapist/patient relation-
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ship is one which under certain circumstances 
will give rise to a duty on the part of the 
therapist to protect third persons from harm. 
• * • 
Moreover, the doctor-patient relationship 
between Dr. Hopper and Hinckley was one which 
gave rise to certain duties on the part of Dr. 
Hopper. 
570 F. Supp. at 1338. 
Thus, Brady explicitly holds that a duty is owed but finds 
that under the case's unique fact situation that there was no 
breach of duty. 
Furthermore, Brady is a 1983 federal district court case that 
interpreted Colorado law before the Colorado courts had examined 
the "duty" issue. The language in Brady to which Valley now 
clings, "specific threats to specific victims," was not followed by 
the Colorado Supreme Court. In Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 
(Colo. 1989), the court factually distinguished Brady from cases 
such as this one by pointing out that Brady fell into the least 
duty-intensive cases because Hinckley was not seeking hospitaliza-
tion, had no history of prior violent propensities, and had never 
made overt threats against anyone. Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d at 
1210. 
Other jurisdictions have also refused to follow Brady. For 
example, the Arizona Supreme Court recently reversed an Arizona 
intermediate court that adopted the Brady test of specific threats 
and identified victims. In Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 161 Ariz. 
58, 775 P.2d 1122 (Ariz. 1989), the Arizona Supreme Court writes: 
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We believe the Brady approach is too narrow. 
Tarasoff envisioned a broader scope of a 
psychiatrist's duty when the court stated: 
'[o]nce a therapist does in fact determine, or 
under applicable professional standards rea-
sonably should have determined, that a patient 
poses a serious danger of violence to others, 
he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
protect the foreseeable victim of that danger. 
17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. 
Rptr. at 25. Additionally, we agree with 
those cases interpreting Tarasoff which state 
that a psychiatrist should not be relieved of 
this duty merely because his patient never 
verbalized any specific threat. 
Id. at 1127. Appellant respectfully asserts Brady is too narrow, 
does not comport with the majority of cases, and should not be 
followed. 
CONCLUSION 
The common law and social policy all provide that SLCMH owed 
duty to Shaundra and Kathy Higgins as victims endangered by 
Trujillo's dangerous and psychotic condition. The trial court's 
judgment should therefore be reversed in this Court and the case 
should be remanded for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 7 day of April, 1991. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
Rodney G. Snow 
Neil A. Kaplan 
James L. Warlaumont 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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64-7-29 STATE INSTITUTIONS 
(11) The word "designee'' moans a physician who lias responsibility for 
medical functions including admission, treatment, and discharge. 
History: 0. 1943, 85-7-55, enacted by 
L. 1951, ch. 113, §3; L. 1971, ch. 172, §4; 
1975, ch. 198, § 16. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1971 amendment substituted "in a 
mental health facility" for "in a hospital 
pursuant to this act" at the end of sub-
sec. (2); substituted "or" for "and" be-
fore "a medical officer" in subsec. (3); 
substituted "division of mental health" 
for "department of public welfare" in 
subsec. (4); added subsecs. (5) and (6); 
and made minor changes in style. 
The 1975 amendment substituted numer-
ical for lettered designations of subsec-
tions; substituted subsec. (1) for former 
subsec. (a) which read: "The words 'men-
tally ill individual' mean an individual 
having a psychiatric or other disease 
which substantially impairs his mental 
health"; inserted "preferably a psychia-
trist" near the beginning of subsec. (4), 
and added to the end of the first sentence 
of subsec. (4) "or another licensed mental 
health professional * * * in the treatment 
of mental or related illness" and added 
the last two sentences to subsec. (4); 
added subsecs. (7) to (11); and made 
minor changes in punctuation. 
Cross-Reference. 
Limitation of application as to crimi-
nally insane, 64-7-54. 
64-7-29. Admission of voluntary patient for observation or care—Age 
of patient.—The superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or director of 
a mental health facility or either of their designees may admit for observa-
tion, diagnosis, care, and treatment any individual who is mentally ill or 
has symptoms of mental illness and who, being sixteen years of age or 
over, applies therefor, and any individual under sixteen years of age 
who is mentally ill or has symptoms of mental illness, if his parent or legal 
guardian applies therefor in his behalf. 
No person over sixteen years of age may be hospitalized or continue to 
be hospitalized against his will, except as provided in this chapter. 
History: C. 1943, 85-7-56, enacted by L, 
1951, en. 113, §3; L. 1971, ch. 172, §5; 
1975, ch. 198, § 17. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1971 amendment inserted "or di-
rector of a mental health facility" after 
"superintendent of the Utah State Hos-
pital" at the beginning of the section. 
The 1975 amendment inserted "or either 
of their designees" near the beginning of 
the section; and added the second para-
graph. 
Cross-Reference. 
Limitation of application as to crimi-
nally insane, 64-7-54. 
64-7-30. Discharge of patient.—The superintendent or director of a 
mental health facility shall discharge any patient who in the opinion of 
the superintendent or director, has recovered and may discharge any 
patient whose hospitalization is determined to be no longer advisable 
except as provided by section 78-3a-40, but an effort shall be made to 
assure that any further supportive services required to meet the patient's 
needs upon release will be provided. If the patient has been hospitalized 
under judicial proceedings, procedures under 64-7-42 and 64-7-43 shall be 
followed. 
History: c. 1943, 85-7-57, enacted by 
L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1975, ch. 198, § 18. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment rewrote this sec-
tion which read: "The superintendent of 
the hospital shall discharge any voluntary 
patient who has recovered and may dis-
charge any voluntary patient whose hos-
pitalization he determines to be no longer 
advisable." 
Cross-Beferences. 
Application for release by one commit-
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ted after having boon found not guilty of 7 C.J.S. Asylums § 7; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals 
crime by reason of insanity, 77-24-16. § 7; 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 72. 
Limitation of application as to criminal- 41 Am. Jur. 2d 583-586, Incompetent 
ly insane, 64-7-54. Persons §§ 44-48. 
Collateral References. Habeas corpus on ground of restoration 
Asylums<£»5; Hospitals@=>5; M e n t a l to sanity of one confined as an incom-
Health^»59. potent other than in connection with 
crime, 21 A. L. R. 2d 1004. 
64-7-31. Release of voluntary patient.—A voluntary patient who re-
quests release or whose release is requested, in writing, by the patient's 
legal guardian, parent, spouse, or adult next of kin shall be released 
forthwith except that: 
(1) If the patient were admitted on the patient's own application and 
the request for release is made by a person other than the patient, release 
may be conditioned upon the agreement of the patient thereto, and 
(2) If the patient, by reason of age, was admitted on the application 
of another person, any release prior to becoming sixteen years of age may 
be conditioned upon the consent of the patient's parent or guardian, and 
(3) If the superintendent or director of the mental health facility 
or either of their designees is of the opinion that release of a patient would 
be unsafe for the patient or others, release of the patient may be postponed 
for up to 48 hours excluding weekends and holidays provided that the 
superintendent or director or either of their designees must cause to be 
instituted involuntary hospitalization proceedings with the district court 
within the specified time period unless cause no longer exists for instituting 
such proceedings. Written notice of such denial with the reasons for 
such denial must be given to the patient without undue delay. No judicial 
proceedings shall be commenced with respect to a voluntary patient unless 
release of the patient has been requested by the patient or, if under the 
age of sixteen, by the patient's parent or guardian. 
History: C. 1943, 86-7-58, enacted by opinion the release of the patient would 
L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, § 2; be unsafe for the patient or others, release 
1971, ch. 172, §6 [a ] ; 1975, ch. 198, §19. may be postponed on application for as 
long as the court or a judge hereof deter-
Compilex'8 Notes. mines to be necessary for the commence-
The 1953 amendment deleted the subsec- ment of proceedings for judicial hospitali-
tion designation " (a )" before the present zation, but in no event for more than five 
introductory paragraph; added a proviso days, provided that judicial proceedings 
to subd. (3) which was essentially the for hospitalization shall not be commenced 
fourth paragraph formerly designated as with respect to a voluntary patient unless 
"(b)"; deleted "Notwithstanding any other release of the patient has been requested 
provision of this act" from the beginning by himself or the individual who applied 
of the proviso; and made a minor change for his admission"; and made numerous 
in phraseology. changes in phraseology and punctuation. 
The 1971 amendment deleted "of the Laws 1951, ch. 113 added two sections 
hospital" after "superintendent" and in- appearing in Code 1943, Supp. numbered 
serted "or director of the mental health identically as 85-7-58. The sections are 
facility" in subd. (3). compiled herein as 64-7-31 and 64-7-32. 
The 1975 amendment rewrote subd. (3), Laws 1971, ch. 172, contained two sec-
which read: "If the superintendent or di- tions designated as "section 6." 
rector of the mental health facility, within 
forty-eight hours from the receipt of the Cross-Reference. 
request, files with the district court or a Limitation of application as to crimi-
judge thereof a certification that in his nally insane, 64-7-54. 
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Collateral References. 
AsvlurasG=>5; Hospitais@=»5; Menta l 
Health<§=>59. 
7 C.J.S. Asylums § 7; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals 
§ 7; 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 72. 
41 Am. Jur. 2d 583-586, Incompetent 
Persons SS 44-48. 
Habeas ooipus on ground of restoration 
to sanitv of one connned as an incom-
petent other than m connection with 
crime, 21 A. L. B. 2d 1004. 
64-7-32. Involuntary hospitalization procedures.—The following ways 
are available for involuntary hospitalization: 
(1) Emergency procedures for temporary hospitalization. 
(a) Hospitalization on medical certification; emergency procedure. 
(b) Hospitalization without endorsement of medical certification; emer-
gency procedure. 
(2) Hospitalization on court order; judicial procedure. 
History: C. 1943, 85-7-58, enacted by L. 
1951, ch. 113, § 3 ; L. 1953, ch. 124, §2; 
1971, ch. 172, § 6 0 3 ; 1975, cfc. 198, §20. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1953 amendment made no change 
in this section. 
The 1971 amendment deleted "of the 
hospital" alter "superintendent" and in-
serted "or director of the mental health 
facility" at the beginning of the former 
introductory paragraph; and made a minor 
change in phraseology. 
The 1975 amendment substituted "The 
following ways are available for involun-
tary hospitalization" at the beginning of 
the section for "The superintendent or 
director of mental health facility is au-
thorized to receive therein for observa-
tion, diagnosis, care, and treatment any 
individual whose admission is applied for 
under any of the following procedures"; 
inserted "Emergeny procedures for tem-
porary hospitalization" at the beginning 
of subsec. (1); deleted former subd. (a) 
which read: "Hospitalization on medical 
certification; standard nonjudicial pro-
cedure"; redesignated former subds. (b) 
and (c) as qubds. ( lHa) and Cl)(b): and 
redesignated former subd. (d) as subsec. 
(2). 
Laws 1971, ch. 172, contained two sec-
tions designated as "section 6." 
Cross-References. 
Criminal prosecutions, inquiry into de-
fendant's sanity, 77-24-15, 77-48-1 et seq., 
77-49-1 et seq. 
Limitation of application as to crimi-
nally insane, 64-7-54. 
Collateral References. 
Mental Health<§=>37-46. 
44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 14-34. 
41 Am. Jur. 2d 547-564, 577-582, Incom-
petent Persons §§ 8-25, 39-42. 
64-7-33. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 64-7-33 (C. 1943, 85-7-59, enacted 
by L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3; L. 1953, ch. 124, 
§ 2; 1963, ch. 159, § 1; 1967, ch. 174, § 130; 
1971, ch. 172, § 7), relating to admission 
to the Utah State Hospital on certification 
by examiners was repealed bv Laws 1975, 
ch. 198, § 35. 
64-7-34. Admission to mental health facility—Requirements and proce-
dure—Costs.—(1) Any individual may be admitted to a mental health 
facility upon: 
(a) Written application by a responsible friend, relative, spouse, or 
guardian of the individual, a mental health or peace officer, or the head of 
any institution as defined in section 64-7-28 stating belief that the individual 
is likely to cause injury to himself, herself or others if not immediately 
restrained, and the grounds for such belief, and 
(b) A certification by at least one licensed physician that the physician 
has examined the individual within a three-day period immediately pre-
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ceding said certification and is of the opinion that the individual is 
mentally ill and, because of the individual's illness, is likely to injure him-
self, herself or others if not immediately restrained. 
(c) Such a certificate upon endorsement for such purpose by a judge 
of the district court or a member of the board of county commissioners of 
the county in which the individual is present, shall authorize any mental 
health or peace officer to take the individual into custody and transport 
the individual to a mental health facility. 
(2) If a duly authorized mental health or peace officer observes a 
person involved in conduct which leads the officer to have probable cause 
to believe that such person is mentally ill, as defined by this act, and 
that, because of such apparent mental illness and conduct, there is a sub-
stantial likelihood of serious harm to that person or to others pending pro-
ceedings for examination and certification as provided in this act, the 
officer may take the person into protective custody. Immediately there-
after, the officer shall transport the person to a mental health facility and 
there make application for the person's admission therein. The application 
shall be upon a prescribed form and shall include the following: 
(a) A statement by the officer that he believes on the basis of personal 
observation that the person is, as a result of a mental illness, a danger to 
self or others. 
(b) The specific nature of the danger. 
(c) A summary of the observations upon which the statement of 
danger is based. 
(d) A statement of facts which called the person to the attention of 
the officer. 
(3) Any person admitted under this section may be held for a max-
imum of 24 hours. At the expiration of 24 hours time the person shall be 
considered a voluntary patient subject to the provisions of sections 64-
7-29, 64-7-30 and 64-7-31 and notice of such status shall be given to the 
patient. 
(4) Costs of all proceedings under this section shall be paid by the 
county in which such person is found unless the person is financially able 
to pay the same in which event he shall pay. 
History: C. 1943, 85-7-60, enacted by The 1975 amendment rewrote this sec-
L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3 ; L. 1953, ch. 124, §2 ; turn which read: "A. Anv individual may 
1963, ch. 159, § 1 ; 1971, ch. 172, §8; 1975, be admitted to a mental health facility 
ch. 198, § 21. upon 
"(1) Written application bv a friend, 
Compiler's Notes. relative, spouse, or guardian of the indi-
The 1953 amendment inserted the refer- vidual, a health or public welfare or peace 
ence to "a member of the board of countv officer, or the head of anv institution as 
commissioners" in subsec. B. defined in section 64-7-33 stating his belief 
The 1963 amendment rewrote the first that the individual is likely to cause m-
part of subd. A(l) which read: "Writ- jurv to himself or others if not lmmedi-
ten application by any health or peace offi- atelv restrained, and the grounds for such 
cer or by any other person stating his belief, and 
belief ****." "(2) A certification by at least one li-
The 1971 amendment substituted "a men- censed phvsician that he has examined the 
tal health facility" for "the Utah State individual and is of the opinion that the 
Hospital" in both subsecs. A and B. indiwdual is mentally ill and, because of 
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his illness, is likely to injure himself or Cross-Beference. 
others if not immediately restrained. Limitation of application as to crimi-
"An individual with respect to whom
 n a l ly insane, 64-7-54. 
such a certificate has been issued may be 
admitted on the basis thereof at any time Collateral References, 
before the expiration of three days after Mental Health^»37-46. 
the date of examination. 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 14-34. 
"B. Such a certificate, upon endorse- 41 Am. Jur. 2d 547-564, 577-582, Incom-
ment for such purpose by the head of a petent Persons §§ 8-25, 39-42. 
local board of health, a judge of the dis-
trict court or a member of the board of
 R i M w i t h o u t j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g to 
county commissioners of the county m
 a r r e * t a n d d e t a i n o n e w h o \ o r i s % u g . 
which the individual is present, shall au-
 t e d o f b e i m e n t a l l v d e r anged, 92 
thorize any health or peace officer to take A L B 2d 570 
the individual into custody and transport 
him to a mental health facility." 
64-7-35. Repealed. 
Repeal tective custody pending examination and 
Section 64-7-35 (C. 1943, 85-7-61, enacted certification, was repealed by Laws 1975, 
by L. 1951, ch. 113, § 3 ; L. 1953, ch. 124, eh. 198, §35. 
§2; 1971, ch. 172, §9), relating to pro-
64-7-36. Involuntary hospitalization—Examination of patient—Hearing 
—Power of court—Mental health commissioner, appointment and duties— 
New hearing procedure — Costs. — (1) Proceedings for the involuntary 
hospitalization of an individual may be commenced by the filing of a written 
application with the district court of the county in which the proposed 
patient resides or is found, by a responsible friend, relative, spouse or 
guardian of the individual, or by a licensed physician, a mental health, 
public welfare or peace officer, or the head of any public or private in-
stitution in which such individual may be. Any such application shall be 
accompanied by a certificate of a licensed physician stating that within a 
seven-day period immediately preceding the certification the physician 
has examined the individual and is of the opinion that the individual is 
mentally ill and should be hospitalized, or a written statement by the 
applicant that the individual has been requested to but has refused to 
submit to examination by a licensed physician. Said application shall be 
sworn to under oath and shall state the facts upon which the application 
is based. Prior to filing the application, the court may require the applicant 
to consult a mental health facility or may direct a mental health profes-
sional from a mental health facility to interview the applicant and the 
proposed patient to determine the existing facts and report them to the 
court. Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual 
under the age of eighteen years who is under the continuing jurisdiction 
of the juvenile court may be commenced by the filing of a written ap-
plication with the juvenile court in accordance with the provisions of this 
section and said court shall have jurisdiction to proceed in such case in 
the same manner and with the same authority as the district court. 
(2) Upon receipt of an application or the report the court shall give 
written notice of the proceeding to the proposed patient, to the legal 
guardian, if any, and to the spouse, parents, and nearest known other 
relative or friend. 
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Notice to the proposed patient shall srt forth the allegations of the 
application and any reported facts. 
If the court finds from the application and any reported facts that 
there is probable cause that the proposed patient's mental condition re-
quires hospitalization pending the hearing, the court shall order that the 
proposed patient be taken to and detained in whatever mental health 
facility or other location is most appropriate. 
If there are no appropriate mental health resources within the district, 
the court may in its discretion transfer the case to any other district court 
within the state of Utah provided that said transfer will not be adverse 
to the interest of the proposed patient. 
(3) If the application avers that the proposed patient is in such 
condition that the patient is in immediate danger of destroying property, 
or injuring himself, herself, or others, or if the proposed patient has re-
fused to submit to examination either upon request of the applicant or 
upon interview with a mental health professional as directed by the court, 
the court shall issue an order directed to any mental health or peace 
officer to take the proposed patient forthwith to any mental health facility 
for the purpose of an examination by two designated examiners as provided 
in subsection (4). If a proposed patient refuses to submit to an examina-
tion by the designated examiners, the proposed patient shall promptly be 
taken before a judge of a district court who shall advise the proposed 
patient of proceedings filed for involuntary hospitalization and the re-
quirements of the law and order the proposed patient to submit to such 
examination if good cause appears therefor. If the individual refuses to 
submit to such examination, the court may order that the proposed patient 
be taken to a mental health facility and examined. 
(4) Within twenty-four hours after the order for detention or exam-
ination is given, the court shall appoint two designated examiners to 
examine the proposed patient. The examination shall be held at the home 
of the proposed patient, a hospital or other medical facility, or at any 
other suitable place not likely to have a harmful effect on the patient's 
health. Said examiners shall orally or in writing report to the court their 
findings as to the mental condition of the proposed patient within forty-
eight hours after said appointment exclusive of weekends or holidays. 
If the report is given orally, a written report shall thereafter be forwarded 
to the court. 
If the report of the designated examiners is to the effect that the 
proposed patient is not mentally ill, the court may without taking any 
further action terminate the proceedings and dismiss the application; 
otherwise, it shall forthwith i\x a date for hearing to b<> held not more 
than ten days from receipt of the initial report. 
(5) At the hearing, an opportunity to be represented by counsel 
shall be afforded to every proposed patient, and if neither the patient nor 
others provide counsel, the court shall appoint counsel. In the case of an 
indigent patient, the payment of reasonable attorneys fees for counsel 
as determined by the court shall be made by the county in which the 
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patient resides or was found. The proposed patient, tho applicant, and 
all other persons to whom notice is required to be given shall be afforded 
an opportunity to appear at the hearing, to testify, and to present and 
cross-examine witnesses, and the court may in its discretion receive the 
testimony of any other person. The court is authorized to exclude all 
persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings. The hearing shall 
be conducted in as informal a manner as may be consistent with orderly 
procedure and in a physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect 
on the mental health of the proposed patient. The court shall receive all 
relevant and material evidence which may be offered subject to the rules 
of evidence. 
The mental health facility or the physician in charge of the patient's 
care shall provide to the court at the time of the hearing the following 
information: the admission notes, the diagnosis, any doctors' orders, the 
progress notes, the nursing notes and the medication records pertaining 
to the current hospitalization. Said information shall also be supplied to 
the patient's counsel at the time of the hearing and at any time prior 
thereto upon request. 
(6) The court shall order hospitalization if, upon completion of the 
hearing and consideration of the record, the court finds beyond a reason-
able doubt that the proposed patient: 
(a) Is mentally ill, and 
(b) Because of the patient's illness there is an immediate danger that 
the proposed patient will injure himself, herself or others if allowed to 
remain at liberty, or 
(c) Is in need of custodial care or treatment in a mental health 
facility and, because of the patient's illness, either 
(i) lacks sufficient insight to make responsible decisions as to the 
need for care and treatment as demonstrated by evidence of unwilling-
ness or inability to follow through with treatment, the need for said 
treatment having been adequately demonstrated to the court, or 
(ii) lacks sufficient capacity to provide himself or herself with the 
basic necessities of life, and 
(d) There is no appropriate less restrictive alternative to a court 
order of hospitalization, and the court has determined that the hospital 
or mental health facility in which the individual is to be hospitalized 
pursuant to this act can provide the individual with treatment that is 
adequate and appropriate to the individual's conditions and needs. In the 
absence of the required findings of the court after the hearing, the court 
shall forthwith dismiss the proceedings. 
(7) The order of hospitalization shall state whether the individual 
shall be detained for a temporary period not to exceed six months or an 
indeterminate period. If hospitalization for a designated temporary period 
is ordered, the patient shall not be retained for a longer period unless 
upon a hearing held pursuant to this section within such designated 
temporary period. Unless otherwise directed by the court, it shall be the 
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responsibility of the division of mental health to assure the carrying 
out of the order within such period as the court shall specify. 
(8) The court is authorized to appoint a mental health commissioner 
to assist in the conduct of hospitalization proceedings who shall be an 
attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah and knowledgeable 
about mental health. In any case in which the court refers an application 
to the commissioner, the commissioner shall promptly cause the proposed 
patient to be examined and on the basis thereof shall either recommend dis-
missal of the application or hold a hearing as provided in this section and 
make findings of fact and recommendations to the court regarding the 
order for involuntary hospitalization of the proposed patient. 
(9) In the event that the designated examiners are unable, because 
of refusal of a proposed patient to submit to an examination, to complete 
such examination upon the first attempt to conduct the same, the court 
shall fix a reasonable compensation to be paid to such designated examiners 
for services in the cause. 
(10) Any person hospitalized under this act or his legally designated 
representative who is aggrieved by the findings, conclusions and order of 
the court, shall have the right to a new hearing upon a petition filed with 
the court within thirty days of the entry of the court order. In the event 
the petition alleges error or mistake in the medical findings, the court shall 
appoint three impartial medical examiners previously unrelated to the 
case who shall conduct an additional examination of the patient. The 
new hearing shall in all other respects be conducted in the manner other-
wise permitted in this act. 
(11) Costs of all proceedings under this section shall be paid by the 
county in which the proposed patient resides or is found. 
History: C. 1943, 85-7-62, enacted by I*. 
1951, ch. 113, §3 ; L. 1953, ch. 124, §2; 
1963, ch. 60, § 1; 1967, ch. 174, § 131; 1971, 
ch. 172, § 10; 1975, ch. 198, § 22. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1953 amendment inserted subsec. D, 
designated former subsecs. D to I as E 
to J, and added subsec. K. 
The 1963 amendment, in subsec. G, sub-
stituted "consistent" for "considered" in 
the third sentence and substituted "the 
court shall" for "the court may, in its dis-
cretion" in the last sentence and, in subd. 
H(2), substituted "there is an immediate 
danger that the proposed patient will in-
jure himself" for "is likelv to injure him-
self." 
The 1967 amendment substituted "divi-
sion of mental health" for "department of 
public welfare" in subsec. I. 
The 1971 amendment substituted "men-
tal health facility" for "mental hospital" 
or "hospital" throughout the section; add-
ed subsec. L; and made numerous changes 
in phraseology, punctuation and style. 
The 1973 amendment lrwrote this sec-
tion which read: "A. Proceedings for the 
involuntary hospitalization of sin individ-
ual may be commenced by the tiling of a 
written application with the district court 
of the county in which the proposed pa-
tient resides or is found, by a friend, rela-
tive, spouse or guardian of the individual, 
or by a licensed physician, a health or 
public welfare or peace officer, or the head 
of any public or private institution in 
which such individual may be. Any such 
application shall be accompanied by a cer-
tificate of a licensed physician stating that 
he has examined the individual and is of 
the opinion that he is mentally ill and 
should be hospitalized, or a written state-
ment by the applicant that the individual 
has refused to submit to examination by a 
licensed physician; provided, that when an 
application is not accompanied by the cer-
tificate of a licensed physician, the court 
shall proceed in accordance with section 
6-1-7-36.5. 
"B. Upon receipt of an application the 
court shall give notice thereof to the pro-
posed patient, to his legal guardian, if 
any, and to his spouse, parents, and near-
est known other relative or friend. If, 
however, the court has reason to boliovo 
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